Participatory GovernanceA crucial potential source of legitimacy is the various forms of participation by fishers and other stake holders in making management decisions. When the focus is on participation by fishers a commonly used term is "co-management" (Wilson et al. 2003). Co-management mobilizes several assets to aid effective management. One is facilitated access to information (Pinkerton 1989) including aid in the enforcement of fisheries regulations. Others are increased legitimacy through increased transparency in decision making (Jentoft 1989), greater accountability for officials (Magrath 1989), and increased sensitivity to local perspectives (Pomeroy and Carlos 1997). The weight of the evidence from global experiences with co-management generally and strongly supports the hypothesis that co-management makes management more effective (Wilson et al. 2003). The relationship between participation and management, however, is complicated. First, there is the critical question of who legitimately participates (Wilson and McCay 1998). Moreover, participation alone does not increase satisfaction with policies. In a survey of stakeholders, Hunt and Haider (2001) found no relationship between participation and satisfaction with forestry policy. While participation may increase a sense of inclusion and ownership, often depending on how the participation is done, people often participate in a process because they are opposed to a policy in the first place. The case study literature points to many instances where public participation in science-based policy has been unhelpful. In some situations apparent explanations for risks is deceptive, leading to public reactions based on an unrealistic appraisal of the situation (Collins and Evans 2002). Culture gaps between experts and lay people lead to communicative breakdowns that exacerbate mistrust (Kaminstein 1996). Participatory governance has been institutionalised in a number of ways. This is a difficult challenge because of the tensions between needing the participation of stakeholders and the legal principle, almost universal in the West, that management is carried out on behalf of the entire public and not for the benefit of user groups. In general (Table One) it is useful to distinguish between small scale co-management efforts and those carried out on a regional or larger scale (Wilson et al. 2003). On a small scale, a bay for example, nearly all stakeholders are able to participate in face-to-face or almost face-to-face discussions. Stakeholders have a chance to air their differences and a good deal of legitimacy is made possible by the participation of local and county-level governments. This model is in some use in Europe, there are several co-management efforts, for example, doing an eco-system approach on the North Sea related to the EU Natura 2000 initiative. On a larger scale, where questions of representation come into play, participatory governance has proven more difficult. The United States has perhaps the most developed system with it Regional Fisheries Management Councils, which began in the 1970s. This experiment has gone through difficult growing pains. The initial nearly complete exclusion of conservation groups, for one thing, led to US fisheries management being considerably hampered by a large number of law suits. Members are appointed by state governors and this has severely undercut the advantages of co-management as most people in the fisheries still felt unrepresented in management. This experience is very relevant for us as the CFP is beginning to experiment with regional level, though purely advisory, co-management with the RACs. There has been a real tendency in the literature to assume that participatory governance is always a good thing. Experience has shown that, in spite of a generally positive record, it is not always good and there are a number of both factors in both design and implementation that affect outcomes (Wilson et al. 2003) The application of this innovation needs to be carefully examined in respect to any management regime for which it is being considered. Rights-based ApproachesRights-based approaches to fisheries management mimic terrestrial property rights by allocating a right to the fisheries resource, in situ,. There are many forms but a basic difference among them is if the allocation is to individuals as private property, or to group as a form of common property. Basic economic theory argues strongly for the individual form, especially individual transferable quotas or ITQs. ITQs allocate shares of the TAC among fishermen who subsequently are allowed to buy, sell or lease quota shares among themselves. Because ITQs create some degree of ownership over a quota share, and hence the control of fishing practice, the race for fish is ended and fishermen have an incentive to minimize costs and maximize revenues. Consequently, efficiency is promoted through the pursuit of economic self-interest. Allocation, formerly an expensive component of fishery management, becomes the function of the quota share market. Less efficient producers tend to sell their quota share and leave the fishery, reducing the level of fishing capacity in the fleet. Thus, ITQs are perceived primarily as a measure of avoiding over-investment and generating resource rent. ITQ programs have been operative for some years now in Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the US. ITQs have several drawbacks. The do not directly address some nature conservation objectives such as maintenance of biodiversity. On the grounds of equity and distributional effects some also contest the merits of ITQ’s for fisheries in temperate waters. Copes (1997:65) remarks that the “theoretical case for superiority is highly dependent on gross simplifications imbedded in the implicit or explicit assumptions, which remove the ITQ mode for the real world of fisheries.” He is troubled by social inequities that ITQs tend to create, for instance between generations of fishers. In the case of Iceland, Helgason and Palssón (1998) document that quota rights tend to become geographically concentrated, thus removing from a number of coastal communities an important part of their economic base. For others, however, ITQs remain the solution. As Davis (1996:97) writes in summary of a number of studies in a special journal issue ITQs “are associated with the achievement of long sought fisheries management goals, goals such as resource conservation, economic efficiency, fisheries sustainability, and, even, harvester co-participation in fisheries management. ITQs remain a contested issue in fisheries management in most countries where the system have been introduced. ITQ systems do address some important issues – such as the prevalent excess harvesting capacity that pose pressure on stocks and profits, they are largely insensitive to the social and cultural impacts on communities. They can also make the barriers of access for young newcomers insurmountable, thus impeding on the long term efficiency of markets and the survival of communities. The other main alternative, group rights, are in use in Alaska, Canada and in Europe in the form of quota allocations to Producer Organizations in the United Kingdom. In both the Canadian and UK cases, a number of the community groups managing these quota allocations do so by creating their own internal ITQ system. This is a particularly interesting innovation in that it combines participatory governance with a rights-based regime and, arguably, creates an ITQ system that achieves most of the benefits of ITQs while mitigating the negative effects. CEVIS will pay particular attention to these systems in both the international (WP 2) investigations and the IEF Test Cases (WP 4-7). Effort ControlCEVIS will examine effort control in two basic forms: as allocated fishing effort among fishers, e.g. the allocation of days-at-sea and as Marine Protected Areas which reduce or eliminate fishing effort in particular areas, either specific times or all the time. Both of these kinds of effort control have been gaining attention in Europe as they are seen by some people, especially in the industry, as working very well in neighbouring areas outside of the CFP, especially the Faeroe Islands. They have not been seriously considered in Europe until relatively recently because both kinds of effort control are difficult to calculate clearly enough to be used as the basis of allocation among member states. More recently, however, ways of calculating fishing effort based on kilowatt-days have begun to be used by the Commission, particularly in recovery plans where limits on effort were seen to be unavoidable. Effort controls are, in fact a requirement of recovery plans Kilowatt-days are being allocated to member states and can be distributed to and, in principle transferred among vessels by the member state governments. The Faeroe Island management regime will play an important part in evaluating this innovation. In the Faeroes all the demersal fisheries are governed by individual effort quotas which are allocated as fishing days for various groups of fishing vessels. This system reduced the risks of discards and black landings. It also makes it unnecessary to set annual stock quotas and facilitates flexibility in moving among the most important stocks following catches and prices. The Faeroe system also makes heavy use of marine protected areas, which are the other type of effort control that CEVIS will examine. As areas where fishing and other human activities are restricted or prohibited, MPAs range from highly protected nature reserves to large multi-use areas with modest limitations on specific types of human activities. As a fisheries management tool MPAs have gained increasing popularity over the last couple of decades and some consider their establishment as a necessary condition for successful fisheries management. MPAs are expected to reduce fishing on spawning stocks and recruits, to increase fish abundance within the protected area and to promote spill over of the increased fish abundance into neighbouring areas where it may lead to improved catches. By reducing fishing effort MPAs can contribute to ecosystem conservation and may enhance or preserve local biodiversity. Their introduction is therefore often supported by conservation organisations (Halpern and Warner 2003). Once they are established MPAs typically require less biological information than other management tools and they may therefore be a more cost-effective way to conserve fish stocks than either TACs or effort control. Despite these advantages, MPAs have been met with criticism both within and outside the discipline of ecology. One criticism is that their protection is limited to relatively stationary species and that they do little to protect migratory species. MPAs may trigger redistribution and concentration of fishing effort in adjacent areas, potentially leading to overexploitation. The previous experience with MPAs show that few have fulfilled expectations. In an assessment of MPAs around the world Kelleher et al.(1995) thus found that less than 31% of the MPA’s surveyed could be classified as achieving their management objectives. The lack of success has been suggested to be caused by inappropriate MPA size and design, by a lack of economic and social science input in their establishment, by insufficient stakeholder participation and involvement, and by inadequate institutional capacity for monitoring and enforcement (e.g. Jones 2002, Jameson et al. 2002, Defeo and Pérez-Castañeda 2003, Christie et al. 2003, Halpern and Warner 2003, Rudd et al. 2003, Coleman et al. 2004). Decision Rule SystemsCEVIS examines two forms of decision rule systems(Table One), harvest control rule systems, which aim at reducing the reliance on political processes in decision-making on management measures, and non-predictive adaptive systems, which furthermore aim at reducing the traditional reliance on specific predictions about stock dynamics. It must be considered a characteristic of any decision rule system that it to some extent aim at diminishing the importance of politics. Decision rule systems can be considered self-binding mechanisms, which are inter alia applied to overcome the urge of politicians (and sect oral interests) to harvest short-term benefits at the expense of long-term benefits. Decision rule systems transfer in effect decision-making power from politicians to a system of more or less 'automatic' responses to certain developments or situations. This has traditionally not been popular with politicians. However, decision rule systems have for various reasons grown more acceptable. It is likely that one reason is that detaching themselves from these specific management decisions, which are in the light of declining fish stocks becoming increasingly unpopular (among fishermen for being too harsh and among conservationist groups for being too soft), has become increasingly attractive for politicians. Another reason could be the prevailing (although not undisputed) belief that fisheries science has reached a level, where one can reasonably construct these rules in the first place and expect a stable and positive outcome in the longer term. Neither of the two types of decision rule systems has historically been used to any significant extent within the EU, where TACs generally has been negotiated on a yearly basis in the Council. However, the introduction of multi-annual recovery plans (and to a lesser extent the optional multi-annual management plans) (Council Regulation 2371/2002, art. 5 and 6), which was an important part of the provisions of the new basic regulation of the CFP implemented from 1 January 2003, is an example of a EU harvest control rule system, which aims at making (at least for a certain period of time) fish stock management subject to rules rather than political negotiations. In this harvest rule system one or more target points (for instance for the preferable biomass of mature fish) are set for stocks, which are considered outside safe biological limits as defined by ICES. These target point shall be reached over a period of time, for instance (but not necessarily) by setting TACs in accordance with harvesting rules, which can as an example state that the resulting fishing mortality rate of the TAC must not transgress a certain value. The first specie to become subject to a recovery plan in the EU was cod in the North Sea (Council Regulation 423/2004). Non-predictive adaptive approaches constitute qualitatively different decision rules systems. Instead of aiming at predicting the results of certain management measures and having rules according to these predictions, these systems focus on monitoring the system (in a broad sense) and adapting to developments and changes, which are discovered by means of generally agreed indicators on the state of different elements of the system. This approach is being implemented in Europe for the first time in the current recovery plan for Southern Hake. The best known example of the non-predictive adaptive systems is the so-called 'Traffic Light method', which has been applied in the advisory process for the Northwest Atlantic shrimp stock and on trial basis for some groundfish stocks in the Scotia-Fundy region, Canada. The basic element of this method is a broad range of indicators, which represent estimates of certain attributes of the fish stocks and the fishery. These indicators, which must be carefully described, validated and generally accepted by the concerned interests, can be categorised as stock assessment indicators, indicators of ecosystem effects of fishing, indicators of economic and social outcomes and, finally, indicators of regulatory compliance. Reference points are determined for the state of each of these indicators to determine the boundaries between the traffic light colours: green (go ahead), yellow (beware) and red (danger). The traffic light element of the method is mostly for communication purposes and any number of colours, scaling or just numbers could be equally suitable; the original indicator values should always be accessible to the decision-makers. Different, changing combinations of red, yellow and green in various categories should then ideally lead to specific reactions, which have been negotiated beforehand so that the measures can be applied immediately and the system in this way adapt to the changing conditions; this is the element of decision rule system in this method. The form of decision rules is yet to be developed for this system but it is predictable that they will relate to similar measures as harvest rule systems. Biological RobustnessBiological robustness will be evaluated in terms of long term sustainability of key fish stocks under the different management innovations. We will compare the potential benefits of management innovations based on the observed consequences of innovations in case studies outside Europe in terms of sustainability of fish resources. We will also compare small-scale situations where innovations are in place with similar situations where they are not. The EFIMAS and COMMIT evaluation tools are expected to be useable by April 2007 (Anticipated to be month 16 of this project). These will be the basic tools used in CEVIS for evaluating the relative performance of different innovations. The tools consist of a simulation framework that can model an underlying “truth” and the human perception of that “truth” (i.e. stock assessment, reference points). We will investigate the robustness of the selected management innovations to the variability in natural systems and our ability to understand, monitor and control those systems. Such an approach has been applied in the IWC (1992) to test the potential future performance of alterative proposals for new whaling management procedures and in many other instances also (Kell et al. 1999, McAllister et al. 1999). In our study, the biological systems will refer to the IEF Test Case studies. Economic EfficiencyEconomic efficiency of fisheries can be assessed in many ways. From a strict theoretical viewpoint, the maximisation of resource rents from the fishery is often defined as a clear economic objective of fisheries management (Gordon 1954). Although conceptually resource rents have been theoretically defined and discussed, the amount of empirical work to estimate resource rents in practical management settings is rather more limited. In economic efficiency terms it has therefore been more straightforward to analyse profit margins or other performance indicators. But why is the level of economic efficiency so important to the management of fisheries? As Hannesson (1996, p.109) states: “While it is true that an inefficient and unproductive technology would safeguard the fish stocks, this method of solving the problem of overfishing would have highly undesirable economic effects. Society at large would forego the benefits brought out by increased productivity, which consist of reducing the amount of labour and possibly other resources necessary to obtain a tonne of fish, so that they can be put to better use elsewhere”. A good introduction to economic aspects of the management of fisheries can be found in OECD (1997). Sutinen (1999) further examines how various management regimes and fishery characteristics help determine the conditions under which fishery resources are conserved and economic performance improved. By means of empirical examples drawn from fisheries in OCED countries he shows how individual quotas are an effective means of controlling exploitation, of mitigating race to fish and most of its attendant effects, of generating resource rent an increased profits, and of reducing the number of participants in the fishery, as suggested by Scott (1955). The identification of economic efficiency indicators, and their assessment under various management regimes, is highly relevant. Empirical examples of economic indicators in fisheries worldwide can be found in Sutinen (1999), Schrank, Arnason and Hannesson (2003) and OECD (2003). AER (2004), and its preceding annual reports, gives tabulated indicators of economic performance (e.g. profits, value added) of a wide range of European fleet segments. These sources of information, and indeed applied methodologies, should serve as a solid starting point for this work package. Given that we have a range of economic data readily available (as discussed below in the WP 4 description) we will for the purposes of CEVIS be able to identify a range of economic indicators that will help us analyse the impact of various management options. The EFIMAS and COMMIT modelling frameworks will be the main tool for undertaking this analysis. However, a range of other modelling approaches also exists (FAO 1999, Frost and Kjærsgaard 2003, Lindebo 2004, Andersen 2004) and should supplement our analysis. Cost-effectiveness of ManagementManagement of fisheries includes supporting management decisions (research), making management decisions (administration) and policing management decisions (enforcement). The OECD has estimated the total costs of these for the EU in 1999 as €575 million with 38% spent on research, 43% on enforcement and 19% on administration. 17% of the costs were borne by the Commission with the rest paid by Member States. The amounts spent by Member States varied greatly. Again according to the OECD these represented 1% of landings in Spain, 8% in the United Kingdom, 32% in Sweden and 70% in Finland. There is as yet no standard process for checking, revising or updating these numbers. Economic data collected by Member States of the European Union under the Data Collection Regulation 1543/2000 is aimed at calculating costs to the industry – not to the national administration. Thus the cost of purchasing rights to fish are included but not the cost of inspections. The European Commission produces a multiannual report on the implementation of monitoring measures in Member States but this is largely a descriptive country by country report and does not aim to produce indicators that can be used for comparison. The EU has declared that more management costs should be borne by the industry itself but there are as yet no indications how far this has proceeded. Management responsibility for a particular fishery is shared between different stakeholders - mostly by the flag State and coastal State but also by the State where landings are made. Some of these States handle certain aspects of fisheries management – such as quota distribution – differently from one other. Thus one fishery might have more than one management regime. The objective of this project as far as cost effectiveness is concerned will therefore be to simplify these complexities. Social RobustnessWe understand social robustness in this context to be a combination of three factors that allow a management regime to adapt to a broad range of potential ecological, economic and political situations. These three factors are: 1) the acceptance of the regime by those stakeholders who can influence management success; 2) the institutional sustainability of the regime; and 3) legal conformity’ of the innovations to the existing legal context. Stakeholder acceptance involves how stakeholders perceive and respond to the management. Institutional sustainability points to how well the innovations fit the existing social and political institutions and what mechanisms ensure their adaptive management capacity. Understanding legal conformity requires us to analyze how well do the management innovations reflect and implement relevant EU and international law with respect to fisheries, environment, trade, competition and state-aid. Re 1) Stakeholder acceptance. Fisheries management does not always work according to the intention of policy and decision makers. When the fisheries management implement regulations in the fisheries, the fishers change behaviour and adapt to the new conditions, and a discrepancy between intention and result may arise. Regarding both democratic legitimacy and efficacy/performance, the success of a fisheries management regime depends on how it is perceived by stakeholders. Stakeholders not only provide legitimacy, knowledge and implementation capacities but can obstruct the implementation of the innovation when refusing support. Re 2) Institutional sustainability. The social robustness and success of management innovations also depend on their institutional sustainability. Institutional sustainability is the degree to which the management regime and the proposed innovations fit into the formal and informal institutions that influence the success of fisheries management. A particularly important expression of this success is the management regimes ability to adapt to internal developments and to external changes, such as changes in their natural, social and economic environment. Institutional sustainability is related to a number of observable capacities. These include: 1) Information capacities related to knowledge production, the anticipation of long-term effects of actions and monitoring systems that recognize varying temporal scales; 2) Effective goal formulation and strategy development; and 3) The use of adaptive management strategies that allow long-term management objectives, clear and open communication channels and management structures that promote learning. Re 3) Legal conformity. In order to be socially robust, innovations in fisheries management also need to conform to the relevant international and EU law. A broad range of legal questions relate to innovations in fisheries, especially under EU law, such as the free movement of goods, persons and capital, competition and state aid rules, and the CFP itself. Innovations in fisheries management systems have broad legal implications and we need to examine their robustness across the several formal legal environment within which the innovations function. Such legal questions include aspects of fisheries law, environmental, trade, subsidies and competition law, as well as Community policies such as non-discrimination. On the international level, general fisheries rules include the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as other agreements such as the Straddling Stocks Agreement. More relevant on the international level are regional fisheries agreements and international trade law in general, and especially WTO law with regard to subsidies in the fisheries sector. In EU law a hierarchy of provisions exists. In the EC Treaty, relevant articles concern the fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital), and prohibition of discrimination etc. National fisheries management rules can infringe upon EU provisions on competition and state aids, the 2003 changes in the CFP and the overall EU environmental law have to be taken into account. Rights-based management, for example, should be examined in relation to the general principle of free movement of capital and labour within the EU; the relative stability in the allocation of fishing quotas on Member States; and the responsibility of governance (Frost/Lindebo 2003) While limiting transferability can be problematic, so is transferability itself. Rights based regimes may lead to monopolies (Frost/Lindebo 2003: 29), which are problematic under EU law. Community-based management as well as decision rule systems can lead to a delegation of decision-making, control and enforcement responsibilities, which have to take into account that the state is responsible for the compliance of EU law and regulations by their citizens (Vedsmand/Nielsen 1995: 6).
Finally, national law can play an important role. The
analysis in WP 6 focuses on out the pertinent national legal
and constitutional issues that have to be taken into account
when designing a regime-level innovation. An example for a
constitutional conflict was the 1998 ruling of the Icelandic
Supreme Court, which declared as unconstitutional existing
fisheries laws on ITQs, because the allocation violated the
constitutional provisions against discrimination (Copes/Palssón
2000). Devolved fisheries management systems raise issues of
representation that are not only questions of legitimacy (Ribot
2002) but can also be questions of legality. Since it is
documented that effective implementation of rights-based
systems such as CBFM systems depend on a supporting
legislative framework (Berkes 1994; Kuemlangan/Teigene
1999), lessons learned in the regimes that have made use of
rights based systems will be collected and analysed.
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